The computation of bilinear pairings has been considered the most expensive operation in pairing-based cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we first propose an efficient and secure outsourcing algorithm for bilinear pairings in the two untrusted program model. Compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm, a distinguishing property of our proposed algorithm is that the (resource-constrained) outsourcer is not required to perform any expensive operations, such as point multiplications or exponentiations. Furthermore, we utilize this algorithm as a subroutine to achieve outsource-secure identity-based encryptions and signatures. property of our proposed algorithm is that the (resource-constrained) outsourcer is not required to perform any expensive operations, such as point multiplications or exponentiations. Furthermore, we utilize this algorithm as a subroutine to achieve outsource-secure identity-based encryptions and signatures.
Bilinear Pairings

121
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic additive groups generated by P 1 and P 2 , respec-122 tively. The order of G 1 and G 2 is a large prime order q. Define G T to be a 123 cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map 124 e : G 1 × G 2 → G T with the following properties:
125
(1) Bilinear: e(aR, bQ) = e(R, Q) ab for all R ∈ G 1 , Q ∈ G 2 , and a, b ∈ Z For the ease of simplicity, we use the above notations throughout this paper.
Algorithm for Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairings
134
The input of Chevallier-Mames et al.'s algorithm [20] is two random points
135
A ∈ G 1 , B ∈ G 2 , and the output is e(A, B). Assume that the outsourcer T
136
has been given the value of e(P 1 , P 2 ).
137
(1) The outsourcer T generates two random elements g 1 , g 2 ∈ Z q , and queries the following pairings to the server U : α 1 = e(A + g 1 P 1 , P 2 ), α 2 = e(P 1 , B + g 2 P 2 ), α 3 = e(A + g 1 P 1 , B + g 2 P 2 ).
(2) The outsourcer T verifies that α i ∈ G T , by checking α q i = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3.
138
Otherwise, T outputs ⊥ and halts. −g 1 2 α 3 e(P 1 , P 2 ) g 1 g 2 .
140
(4) The outsourcer T generates four random elements a 1 , r 1 , a 2 , r 2 ∈ Z q , and 141 queries the following pairing to the server U : 142 α 4 = e(a 1 A + r 1 P 1 , a 2 B + r 2 P 2 ).
(5) The outsourcer T computes e(P 1 , P 2 ) r 1 r 2 −a 1 g 1 r 2 −a 2 g 2 r 1 .
T outputs e(A, B) if and only if α 4 = α 4 .
144
Remark 1. We argue that the outsourcer T should perform some expensive 145 operations such as point multiplications and exponentiations. In some cases,
146
this contradicts with the motivation of the outsourcing computations.
147
In this section, we introduce some definitions for secure outsourcing of a cryp-149 tographic algorithm [32] . written by E. Also, there exists a simulator S that, when told that T U (x) was 216 invoked, can simulate the view of E without access to the secret inputs of x. ticipating in the following real process:
234
The real process proceeds in rounds. In round i, the honest (secret, Next, the algorithm T U is run on the inputs (tstate last round (i.e., i for which stop i = TRUE.).
252
· The ideal process:
The ideal process also proceeds in rounds. In the ideal process, we 
280
In the ideal process, we have a stateful simulator S 2 who, equipped and the outputs for each invocation are a random, independent six-tuple 
Outsourcing Algorithm
327
(1) To implement this functionality using U 1 and U 2 , T firstly runs Rand 339 to create a blinding six-tuple (
341
(2) The main trick of Pair is to logically split A and B into random looking 342 pieces that can be computed by U 1 and U 2 . Without loss of generality, let
, and α 3 = e(v 1 V 1 , B +V 2 ).
344
Note that
Therefore, e(A, B) = α 1 α
(3) T then runs
Rand to obtain two new six-tuple
(4) T queries U 1 in random order as
e(x 1 X 1 , x 2 X 2 ) and e(y 1 Y 1 , y 2 Y 2 ) for the test queries. If not, T outputs
358
"error"; otherwise, T can compute e(A, B) = α 1 α
359
Remark 2. Given a random point P in G 1 (or G 2 ), T can compute the inverse point −P easily. Therefore, T can query
we can define the outputs of Rand be
Therefore, T needs not to perform the inverse computation in G T . Proof. The proof is similar to [32] . The correctness is trivial and we only 365 focus on security. Let A = (E, U 1 , U 2 ) be a PPT adversary that interacts with 366 a PPT algorithm T in the one-malicious model. is (estate i , r, ∅)). In either case, S 1 saves the appropriate states.
385
The input distributions to (U 1 , U 2 ) in the real and ideal experiments are com- 
395
Secondly, if one of (U 1 , U 2 ) is dishonest in the round i and it has been detected 396 by both T and S 1 (with probability 1 2 ), then it will result in an output of 397 "error". Finally, we consider the case that the output of Pair is corrupted,
398
i.e., one of (U 1 , U 2 ) is dishonest in the round i while it is undetected (with 399 probability 1 2 ) by T . In the real experiment, the four outputs generated by 400 (U 1 , U 2 ) are multiplied together along with a random value λ −1 (see the step 
426
On the other hand, U 1 (resp. U 2 ) cannot distinguish the two test queries from 427 the two real queries that T makes. If U 1 (resp. U 2 ) fails during any execution
428
of Pair, it will be detected with probability takes roughly 22n multiplications in finite filed GF(p) to compute the Tate pairing e(A, B) when E is a supersingular elliptic curve defined over GF(p) with embedding degree k = 2, where p is a 512-bit prime in order to achieve 80-bit security level.
other operations such as modular additions in Z q . (1) T chooses a random σ ∈ {0, 1} n and computes r = H 3 (σ, m).
471
(2) T runs SM to obtain C 1 = rP and R = rH 1 (ID).
472
(3) T runs Pair to obtain Pair(R, P pub ) → ϕ.
473
(4) T computes C 2 = σ ⊕ H 2 (ϕ) and C 3 = m ⊕ H 4 (σ).
474
(5) T outputs the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ).
475
• Decryption: On input the secret key S ID , and the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ),
476
the outsourcer T runs the subroutine Pair and SM to compute the message 477 m as follows:
478
(1) T runs Pair to obtain Pair(S ID , C 1 ) → ϕ.
481
(4) T computes r = H 3 (σ, m) and then runs SM to obtain rP . The proposed outsource-secure Cha-Cheon signature scheme consists of the 488 following efficient algorithms:
489
• Setup: Chooses a random s ∈ Z * q and sets P pub = sP . Define two crypto-
lic parameters of the system are params = {G 1 , G T , e, q, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 }.
492
The master key is s.
493
• Extract: On input an identity ID, run the extract algorithm to obtain the 494 signing key S ID = sH 2 (ID).
495
• Sign: On input the singing key S ID and a message m, the outsourcer T 496 runs the subroutine SM to generate the signature σ as follows:
497
(1) T chooses a random r ∈ Z * q and runs SM to obtain U = rH 2 (ID).
498
(2) T computes h = H 1 (m, U ).
499
(3) T runs SM to obtain V = (r + h)S ID . The signature is σ = (U, V ).
500
• Verify: On input the verification key ID, the message m, and the signature 501 σ = (U, V ), the outsourcer T runs the subroutine Pair and SM to verify 502 the signature σ as follows:
503
(1) T computes h = H 1 (m, U ).
504
(2) T runs SM to obtain hH 2 (ID) and computes T = U + hH 2 (ID).
505
(3) T runs Pair to obtain Pair(P, V ) → β 1 and Pair(P pub , T ) → β 2 .
506
(4) T outputs 1 if and only if β 1 = β 2 . 
